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DARON ACEMOGLU AND JAUME VENTURA 
We show  that  even  in the  absence  of diminishing  returns  in production  and 
technological  spillovers,  international  trade  leads  to a stable  world income  distri- 
bution.  This  is  because  specialization  and  trade  introduce  de facto  diminishing 
returns:  countries  that  accumulate  capital  faster  than  average  experience  declin- 
ing export prices,  depressing  the rate of return  to capital  and discouraging  further 
accumulation.  Because  of constant  returns  to capital  accumulation  from a global 
perspective,  the  world  growth  rate  is  determined  by policies,  savings,  and  tech- 
nologies,  as  in  endogenous  growth  models.  Because  of  diminishing  returns  to 
capital  accumulation  at the country level,  the cross-sectional  behavior  of the world 
economy  is  similar  to  that  of existing  exogenous  growth  models:  cross-country 
variation  in  economic  policies,  savings,  and  technology  translate  into  cross- 
country  variation  in incomes.  The  dispersion  of the  world  income  distribution  is 
determined  by the  forces  that  shape  the  strength  of the  terms-of-trade  effects- 
the  degree  of openness  to international  trade  and the  extent  of specialization. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Figure  I plots  income  per worker  relative  to the  world  aver- 
age in  1990  against  its  1960 value,  and draws  the  45 degree  line 
for  comparison.  This  picture  of  the  world  income  distribution 
raises  two questions:  first, why are there  such large differences  in 
income  across  countries?  For  example,  some  countries,  such  as 
the  United  States  or Canada,  are more than  30 times  as rich  as 
others  such as Mali or Uganda.  Second, why has the world income 
distribution  been  relatively  stable  since  1960?  A  number  of 
growth  miracles  and disasters  notwithstanding,  the  dispersion  of 
income has not changed  much over this  period: most  observations 
are around the 45 degree line and the standard deviation  of income 
is  similar  in  1990  to what  it was  in  1960  (1.06  versus  0.96).1 
* We  thank  Pol  Antras  and  Ruben  Segura-Cayuela  for  excellent  research 
assistance.  We also  thank  three  anonymous  referees,  Alberto  Alesina,  and semi- 
nar  participants  at  the  University  of  California  at  Berkeley,  Brown  and  Duke 
Universities,  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis,  the Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of New York, the Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  Stanford  University,  and 
the  University  of California,  Los Angeles  for comments  and  suggestions. 
1.  Among  subsets  of countries  with  similar  institutional  structures  there  is 
substantial  narrowing  of differentials.  For example,  the  standard  deviation  of log 
income  per worker  among  OECD economies  was  0.53  in  1960  and fell  to 0.30  in 
1990. In contrast,  there  appears  to be significant  widening  of income  differentials 
during  the  100  years  before  1960.  See,  for  example,  Durlauf  [1995]  and  Quah 
[1997]  on  changes  in  the  postwar  world  income  distribution,  and  Parente  and 
Prescott  [1994]  and  Jones  [1997]  on  its  relative  stability.  Note  also  that  the 
relative  stability  of the  world  income  distribution  is  a postwar  phenomenon;  see 
?  2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard  College and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
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FIGURE I 
Log of Income  per Worker in  1990  and  1960  Relative  to World Average  from 
the  Summers  and  Heston  [1991]  Data  Set 
The thick  line  is  the  45  degree  line. 
Existing  frameworks  for  analyzing  these  questions  are 
built  on  two  assumptions:  (1)  "shared  technology"  or  techno- 
logical  spillovers:  all  countries  share  advances  in  world  tech- 
nology,  albeit,  in  certain  cases,  with  some  delay;  (2) diminish- 
ing  returns  in production:  the  rate  of return  to capital  or other 
accumulable  factors  declines  as  they  become  more  abundant. 
The  most  popular  model  incorporating  these  two  assump- 
tions  is  the  neoclassical  (Solow-Ramsey)  growth  model.  All 
countries  have  access  to a common  technology,  which  improves 
exogenously.  Diminishing  returns  to capital  in production  pull 
all  countries  toward  the  growth  rate  of the  world  technology. 
Differences  in  economic  policies,  saving  rates,  and  technology 
do not lead  to differences  in long-run  growth  rates,  but in levels 
of capital  per worker  and  income.  The  strength  of diminishing 
returns  determines  how  a  given  set  of  differences  in  these 
Pritchett  [1997] for the  widening  of the  world income  distribution  since  1870  and 
Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  Robinson  [2001b]  for the  reversal  in  relative  economic 
rankings  over the  past  500  years,  and widening  over the  past  200  years. THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  661 
country  characteristics  translate  into  differences  in capital  and 
income  per  worker.2 
This  paper offers an alternative  framework  for analyzing  the 
world  income  distribution.  We show  that  even  in the  absence  of 
diminishing  returns  in  production  and  technological  spillovers, 
international  trade-based  on  specialization-leads  to  a  stable 
world  income  distribution.  Countries  that  accumulate  capital 
faster  than  average  experience  declining  export  prices,  reducing 
the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  capital  and  discouraging 
further  accumulation  at home.  They also increase  the demand  for 
products  and the  value  of the  marginal  product  of capital  in the 
rest  of the  world,  encouraging  accumulation  there.  These  terms- 
of-trade  effects  introduce  de  facto  diminishing  returns  at  the 
country  level  and ensure  the  stability  of the  world income  distri- 
bution.  Consequently,  cross-country  differences  in economic  poli- 
cies,  saving  rates,  and  technology  lead  to differences  in  relative 
incomes,  not in  long-run  growth  rates.  How  dispersed  the  world 
income  distribution  will  be for a given  set  of country  character- 
istics  is  determined  by the  forces  that  shape  the  strength  of the 
terms-of-trade  effects; namely,  the degree  of openness  to interna- 
tional  trade  and the  extent  of specialization. 
Some  degree  of specialization  in  production  is  essential  for 
the  terms-of-trade  effects  we  emphasize  here:  if  domestic  and 
foreign  products  were  perfect  substitutes,  countries  would  be 
facing  flat  export  demands,  and  capital  accumulation  would  not 
affect  their  terms  of trade.  That  countries  specialize  in different 
sets  of products  appears  plausible.  Moreover, this  assumption  has 
proved  to be crucial  in  explaining  some  robust  features  of inter- 
national  trade,  such as the substantial  two-way  trade  in products 
of similar  factor  intensities  and  the  success  of the  gravity  equa- 
tion  in  accounting  for  bilateral  trade  flows  (see,  for  example, 
Helpman  [1987]  or Hummels  and Levihnson  [19951). 
We model  the  world  as  a collection  of economies  a la Rebelo 
[1991], with  growth resulting  from accumulation  of capital.  In the 
absence  of international  trade,  countries  grow  at  different  rates 
2.  A different  but related  story recognizes  technology  differences  across coun- 
tries.  Despite  these  differences,  backward  countries  share  some  of the  techno- 
logical  improvements  of advanced  economies  through  spillovers.  These  spillovers 
ensure  the  stability  of the  world  income  distribution,  and  also  determine  how 
differences  in  country  characteristics  translate  into  income  differences.  See,  for 
example,  Grossman  and  Helpman  [19911, Parente  and Prescott  [1994],  Coe and 
Helpman  [1995],  Howitt  [20001,  Eaton  and  Kortum  [1999],  Barro  and  Sala-i- 
Martin  [1997],  and Acemoglu  and Zilibotti  [20011. 662  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
determined  by their  economic  policies,  saving  rates,  and technol- 
ogy. With  international  trade  and  specialization,  the  world  as  a 
whole  still  behaves  as  the  standard  AK  economy,  but  now  all 
countries  share  the  same  long-run  growth  rate. 
To understand  why  countries  tend  to grow at the  same  rate 
and  what  factors  determine  their  relative  incomes,  consider  the 
familiar  steady-state  condition  equating  the  rate  of  return  to 
savings  to the effective  rate  of time  preference.  In our model,  this 
condition  takes  the  form, 
rental  rate  (domestic  capital/world  capital,  technology) 
price  of investment  goods 
= effective  rate  of time  preference. 
The  rental  rate  depends  negatively  on the  relative  capital  of the 
country  because  of terms-of-trade  effects:  countries  that  produce 
more  face  lower  export  prices  and  a lower value  of the  marginal 
product of capital. This  condition also shows  how different charac- 
teristics  affect relative  incomes.  In the  steady  state,  countries with 
lower rates  of time  preference  and lower price of investment  goods 
(those with  fewer distortions  affecting investment)  will have  lower 
rental  rates,  hence  higher  relative  capital  and  income.  Countries 
with  better  technologies  will be richer, in turn, because  they  have 
higher rental  rates  for a given level of relative  capital and income. 
Despite rich interactions  across countries, cross-country income 
differences take a simple form, analogous to the basic Solow-Ramsey 
model. We also show that  cross-country income differences and the 
rate of conditional convergence depend on the strength  of the terms- 
of-trade effects, not on the capital  share in output  as in the Solow- 
Ramsey  model.  For plausible  values  of the  elasticity  of export de- 
mand and the share of exports in GDP, the terms-of-trade effects are 
strong enough to generate  an elasticity  of output to capital sufficient 
to account for observed differences in incomes. 
We also provide evidence  of terms-of-trade  effects.  We look at 
cross-country  growth  regressions  to isolate  differences  in growth 
rates  due  to  accumulation.  As  emphasized  by Barro  [1991]  and 
Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  [19951, countries  that  are poor relative 
to  their  steady-state  income  level  accumulate  faster.  We  show 
that  this  faster  accumulation  is also associated  with  a worsening 
in the  terms  of trade.  Our estimates  imply  that  holding  technol- 
ogy and other  determinants  of steady-state  income  constant,  a 1 
percentage  point faster  growth is associated  with  a 0.6 percentage THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  663 
point  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade.  With  terms-of-trade 
effects  of this  magnitude,  our model  explains  a significant  frac- 
tion of cross-country  income  differences. 
Our main results  are derived in Sections  11 and III in a model 
with  capital  as the  only factor of production  and with  exogenous 
specialization.  Section  IV extends  the model to include labor as an 
additional  factor  of production.  This  extended  model  generates 
higher  wages  and costs  of living  in richer  countries  as is the  case 
in the  data.  Section  V generalizes  our results  to the  case  where 
countries  choose  which  goods,  and how  many  goods,  to produce. 
Despite  endogenous  specialization,  the terms-of-trade  effects  con- 
tinue  to  operate  and  ensure  a  common  long-run  gowth  rate 
across  countries.  As a by-product  of this  analysis,  we  also  obtain 
a simple  theory  of cross-country  technology  differences:  countries 
with  lower  rates  of time  preference  (higher  saving  rates)  have 
better  technologies,  contributing  to their  higher  relative  income. 
Our  study  is  related  to  the  endogenous  growth  literature3 
and to papers  on cross-country  technological  spillovers  mentioned 
above. Howitt  [2000]  is  most  closely  related.  He  shows  that  in a 
model of Schumpeterian  endogenous  growth,  if innovations  build 
on a worldwide  "leading-edge  technology,"  all  countries  grow  at 
the same  rate,  and policy and saving  rate  differences  affect rela- 
tive  incomes.  Howitt's  results  are therefore  parallel  to ours,  but 
rely  on  widespread  technological  spillovers.  We  emphasize  in- 
stead  the  role  of commodity  trade  and  show  that  even  a  small 
amount  of commodity  trade  is sufficient  for all countries  to share 
the same  long-run  growth  rate. 
Our paper also relates  to the literature  on international  trade 
and growth.  A first strand  of the  literature  emphasizes  learning- 
by-doing, and studies  how international  trade  changes  the indus- 
trial  structure  of  countries  and  affects  their  aggregate  rate  of 
productivity  growth.4 A second  strand  studies  how international 
trade affects  the  incentives  to innovate.5  A third  strand  studies 
how international  trade  affects  the  process  of capital  accumula- 
3.  See, for example,  Romer  [1986,  1990], Lucas  [19881, Rebelo  [19911, Gross- 
man  and Helpman  [19911, and  Aghion  and  Howitt  [19921. Although  we  use  the 
formulation  of  Rebelo  with  capital  accumulation  as  the  engine  of  growth,  our 
results  generalize  to a model  in which  endogenous  growth  results  from technical 
change  as in some  of the  other  papers. 
4.  Krugman  [19871, Stokey  [19911, Young  [19911, and Brezis,  Krugman,  and 
Tsiddon  [1993]. 
5.  See,  among  otlhers,  Segerstrom,  Anant,  and Dinopoulos  [19901, Grossman 
and Helpman  [19911, and Rivera,  Batiz,  and Romer  [19911. 664  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
tion  in  the  presence  of some  form  of factor  price  equalization.6 
Our paper  is  closer  to  this  third  line  of research,  since  we  also 
examine  the  effects  of international  trade  on  the  incentives  to 
accumulate  capital.  We depart  from earlier  papers  by focusing  on 
the  case  without  factor  price  equalization.  With  factor  price 
equalization,  the rental  rate  of capital  is independent  of domestic 
capital  and  countries  can  accumulate  without  experiencing  di- 
minishing  returns.  Without  factor  price  equalization,  the  rental 
rate of capital  is determined  by the domestic  capital  stock even in 
the  absence  of technological  diminishing  returns. 
II.  A  WORLD  OF AK  ECONOMIES 
In this  section  we outline  a world of AK economies  with  trade 
and  specialization.  The  main  purpose  of this  model  is to demon- 
strate  how terms-of-trade  effects  create  a force toward  a common 
growth  rate  across  countries.  We  establish  that  any  amount  of 
international  trade  ensures  that  cross-country  differences  in 
technology,  saving,  and  economic  policies  translate  into  differ- 
ences  in income  levels,  not growth  rates.  Countries  that  accumu- 
late  capital  faster  than  average  experience  declining  export 
prices,  reducing  the  rate  of return  to  capital  and  discouraging 
further  accumulation.  These  terms-of-trade  effects  create  dimin- 
ishing  returns  to capital  at the  country  level  and keep  the  world 
distribution  stable. 
A.  Description 
The  world  we  consider  contains  a  continuum  of  countries 
with  mass  1. Capital  is the  only  factor  of production.  There  is  a 
continuum  of intermediate  products  indexed  by z  E  [0,M],  and 
two final products  that  are used for consumption  and investment. 
There  is  free  trade  in  intermediate  goods  and  no trade  in  final 
products  or assets. 
Countries  differ  in  their  technology,  savings,  and  economic 
policies.  In particular,  each country  is defined by a triplet  (R,p,+), 
where  ,u is  an  indicator  of how  advanced  the  technology  of the 
country  is,  p is its  rate  of time  preference,  and 4 is  a measure  of 
the  effect  of policies  and  institutions  on the  incentives  to invest. 
6.  See,  for instance,  Stiglitz  [1970]  and Ventura  [1997].  See  also  Cunat  and 
Maffezoli  [2001] who  analyze  growth  in  a world  economy  that  starts  outside  the 
cone  of diversification,  but  eventually  reaches  factor price  equalization. THE  WORLD INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  665 
We  denote  the  joint  distribution  of  these  characteristics  by 
G([L,p,4)  and  assume  it is time  invariant. 
All  countries  admit  a representative  consumer  with  utility 
function: 
(1)  |lIn  c(t)  * e-P't  * dt, 
where  c(t)  is  consumption  at  date  t  in  the  (L,p,4)-country. 
Throughout  the  paper  we  simplify  the  notation  by  suppressing 
time  and  country  indices  when  this  causes  no  confusion.  The 
budget  constraint  facing  the  representative  consumer  is 
(2)  p1  k+pc  c=y-rk, 
where  Pi  and Pc  are the  prices  of the  investment  and  consump- 
tion  goods,  k  is  capital  stock,  and  r  is  the  rental  rate.  For 
simplicity,  we  assume  that  capital  does  not  depreciate.  Since 
there  is no international  trade  in assets,  income y must  be equal 
to consumption,  Pc  * c,  plus  investment,  pr *  k. 
To introduce  specialization,  we  adopt  the  Armington  [1969] 
assumption  that  products  are differentiated  by origin.7 Let  pL  be 
the  measure  (number)  of intermediates  produced  by the  (L,p,4)- 
country, with  f  . *  dG  = M. A higher  level  of pL  corresponds  to the 
ability  to produce  a larger  variety  of intermediates,  so we  inter- 
pret  p. as  an  indicator  of  how  advanced  the  technology  of  the 
country  is.  In all  countries,  intermediates  are produced  by com- 
petitive  firms using  a technology  that  requires  one unit  of capital 
to produce  one intermediate. 
Each  country  also  contains  many  competitive  firms  in  the 
consumption  and  investment  goods  sectors  with  unit  cost 
functions: 
/IM  \T/(l-E) 
(3)  Bc(r,p(z))  =  rl-T  (  Jp(z)  l-e  dz  I 
M  T/(1-E) 
(4)  BI(r,p(z))=  -*  r1-T 
.  p  (Z) 
I-E  dz 
7.  We make  this  crude assumption  to simplify  the  analysis  and highlight  the 
implications  of specialization  for growth  patterns  in the  simplest  way.  In Section 
V we model  how countries  choose  the  set  of intermediates  that  they  produce  and 
therefore  provide  a microfoundation  for this  assumption. 666  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
where  p(z)  is  the  price  of the  intermediate  with  index  z.  These 
equations  state  that  the  production  of consumption  and  invest- 
ment  goods  requires  the  services  of domestic  capital  and  inter- 
mediates.  The  parameter  T is  the  share  of intermediates  in  pro- 
duction,  and  it  will  also  turn  out  to  be  the  ratio  of  exports  to 
income.  This  ratio  is  usually  interpreted  as  a measure  of open- 
ness.  The parameter  E is the  elasticity  of substitution  among  the 
intermediates  and  also  the  price  elasticity  of foreign  demand  for 
the  country's  products.  The  inverse  of  this  elasticity  is  often 
interpreted  as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  specialization.  We 
assume  that  e  >  1.  This  assumption  rules  out  immiserizing 
growth-the  country becoming  poorer by accumulating  more (see 
Bhagwati  [1958]). Note that  the technologies  for consumption  and 
investment  goods  are  identical  except  for the  shift  factor  4. We 
use this parameter  as a crude measure  of the effect of policies  and 
institutions  on the  incentives  to invest.  Examples  of the  policies 
and  institutions  we  have  in  mind  include  the  degree  of enforce- 
ment  of property rights  or the distortions  created by the tax code.8 
B.  World  Equilibrium 
A competitive  equilibrium  of the world economy  consists  of a 
sequence  of prices  and quantities  such  that  firms and consumers 
maximize  and markets  clear.  Our assumptions  ensure  that  such 
an  equilibrium  exists  and  is  unique.  We  prove  this  by 
construction. 
Consumer  maximization  of (1) subject to (2) yields  the follow- 
ing  first-order  conditions: 
r +  P?  Pc  C 
Pi  Pc  c 
(6)  lim p  k e-Pt -  . 
t -- o  PC'  C 
Equation  (5) is the  standard  Euler  equation  and  states  that  the 
rate of return  to capital,  (r + P1)/I  -  Pc/PC,  must  equal  the rate 
of time  preference  plus  a  correction  factor  that  depends  on  the 
8.  Jones  [1995], Chari, Kehoe,  and McGrattan  [1997], and Parente,  Rogerson, 
and Wright  [2000] have  emphasized  the importance  of such policies  in explaining 
cross-country  differences  in income  levels,  and  a range  of empirical  studies  have 
shown  the  importance  of  institutional  differences  in  affecting  investment  and 
economic  performance  (e.g.,  Knack  and  Keefer  [1995],  Barro  [1997],  Hall  and 
Jones  [1999],  and Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and Robinson  [2001a]). THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  667 
slope  of the  consumption  path.  Equation  (6) is the  transversality 
condition.  Integrating  the  budget  constraint  and using  the  Euler 
and transversality  conditions,  we find that  the  optimal  rule  is to 
consume  a fixed  fraction  of wealth: 
(7)  pc  c  p  =  P  PI  k. 
Equation  (7)  implies  that  countries  with  more  patient  consum- 
ers-low  p-will  have  lower  consumption  to capital  ratios. 
Next  consider  firm  maximization.  The  production  functions 
(3) and (4) ensure  that  all intermediates  are produced  in equilib- 
rium.  Since  firms  in  the  intermediates  sector  are  competitive, 
they  set  their  price  equal  to  marginal  cost,  which  is  the  rental 
rate  of capital.  So the  price  of any  variety  of intermediate  pro- 
duced  in the  (pt, p, +)-country  is  equal  to 
(8)  p =  r, 
where  r is the rental  rate of capital  in the (,u,p,4)-country.  We use 
the  ideal  price  index  for intermediates  as the  numeraire;  i.e., 
(9)  j  (z)`-e  dz  f  M  pl-e  dG=  1. 
Since  all  countries  export  practically  all  of their  production  of 
intermediates  and import  the  ideal  basket  of intermediates,  this 
choice of numeraire  implies  that p is also the terms  of trade of the 
country,  i.e.,  the  price  of exports  relative  to imports.9 
Firms  in the consumption  and investment  sectors  take  prices 
as  given  and  choose  factor  inputs  to maximize  profits.  The  loga- 
rithmic  preferences  in  (1) ensure  that  the  demand  for consump- 
tion  goods is always  strong  enough  to induce  some  production  in 
equilibrium,  so price  equals  cost: 
(10)  p  = r 
On the other hand,  if the country starts  with  a large capital  stock, 
consumers  may  want  to dissave,  and  there  may  not be any  pro- 
9.  Although  each  country  is small  relative  to the  world, it has  market  power 
because  of complete  specialization  in  the  production  of intermediates.  So,  each 
country  may want  to act as a monopolist,  imposing  an optimal  tariff  or an export 
tax.  Whether  they  do  so  or not  does  not  affect  our  results,  and  we  ignore  this 
possibility.  In  any  case,  a  cooperative  equilibrium  with  free  trade  policies  is 
superior  to a noncooperative  equilibrium  in which  all countries  actively  use  trade 
policy,  so we may think  that  countries  have  solved  this  coordination  problem  and 
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duction  of investment  goods.  We rule  this  possibility  out  by as- 
suming  that  the initial  capital  stock is not too large.  This ensures 
that  price  equals  cost for the  investment  good as well: 
(11)  Pi =()-i  rlT. 
Finally,  we  need  to  impose  market  clearing  for capital.  By 
Walras' law,  this  is equivalent  to imposing  trade balance.10 Each 
country  spends  a fraction T  of its  own income  on foreign  interme- 
diates,  while  the rest  of the world spends  a fraction  -  *- ,pu pl-  of 
their  income  on  this  country's  intermediates.  Therefore,  trade 
balance  requires 
(12)  y = 1 . pl-E  .y 
where  Y  f y  * dG is world  income.  Equation  (12) implies  that 
when  the measure  of varieties,  p.,  is larger,  a given level  of income 
y  is  associated  with  better  terms  of trade,  p,  and  higher  rental 
rate  of capital,  since  r  = p.  Intuitively,  a greater  p. implies  that 
for  a  given  aggregate  capital  stock,  there  will  be  less  capital 
allocated  to each variety  of intermediate,  so each will  command  a 
higher  price  in  the  world  market.  Conversely,  for  a  given  p., a 
greater  relative  income y/Y  translates  into  lower  terms  of trade 
and rental  rate. 
C. World  Dynamics 
The state  of the world economy  is fully  described  by a distri- 
bution  of capital  stocks.  A law  of motion  for the  world  economy 
consists  of a rule  to determine  the  trajectory  of this  distribution 
from  any  starting  position.  This  law  of motion  is  given  by  the 
following  pair  of equations  for each  country:" 
(13)  klk  =  -  *rT-  _p, 
(14)  r.k  =p.rl-E.  J r.k  dG. 
10.  Market  clearing  for  capital  implies  that  k  =  kn +  w 
ki, 
where  kn is 
capital  used  in the  nontraded  sector,  and ki  is  capital  used  in the  production  of 
each intermediate.  Given the  Cobb-Douglas assumption,  we have  kn  =  (1  -  T) *  ylr. 
Also because  demand  for each intermediate  is of the  constant  elasticity  form and 
a fraction T of world income Y is spent  on intermediates,  we have ki =  X  pl-  .  Y/p. 
Usingy  =  r  k  k, the market  clearing condition for capital is equivalent  to (12). 
11.  To  obtain  (13),  we  substitute  equations  (7)  and  (11)  into  the  budget 
constraint  (2). To obtain  (14), we  simply  rewrite  equation  (12) using  (2) and (8). THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  669 
For a given  cross  section  of rental  rates,  the  set  of equations  in 
(13) determines  the evolution  of the  distribution  of capital  stocks. 
For a given  distribution  of capital  stocks,  the  set  of equations  in 
(14) determine  the  cross  section  of rental  rates. 
The  world  economy  has  a unique  and  stable  steady  state  in 
which  all  countries  grow  at  the  same  rate.12  To  describe  this 
steady  state,  define  the  world  growth  rate  as x-YIY,  and  the 
relative  income of a (,u,p,4)-country  as yR  yIY.  Then, setting  the 
same  growth rate for all countries,  i.e.,  k/k  = y/y  =  x,  we  obtain 
the  steady-state  cross  section  of rental  rates  as 
/P  +  X  1I 
(15)  r  (  ?x*), 
where  an  asterisk  is  used  to  denote  the  steady-state  value  of a 
variable;  for example,  x*  is  the  steady-state  world  growth  rate. 
Since  p  =  r,  equation  (15)  also  gives  the  steady-state  terms  of 
trade  of the  country,  p*.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  steady 
state  terms  of trade and rental  rates  are constant.  This highlights 
that  the  world  income  distribution  is  stable  not  because  of con- 
tinuously  changing  terms  of  trade,  but  because  countries  that 
accumulate  more face lower terms  of trade,  reducing  the  interest 
rate  and  the  incentives  for further  accumulation.  In the  steady 
state,  both  the  distribution  of capital  stocks  and  relative  prices 
are stable. 
Using  equations  (9),  (8),  (12),  and  (15),  we  can  provide  a 
complete  characterization  of the  world  distribution  of income  in 
the  steady  state: 
(16)  YR  p)P tX  l) 
f  z  +  \ ~~~~(E  - )/T 
(17)  J  +  x.  )(  */dGo=  1. 
Equation  (16)  describes  the  steady-state  world  income  distribu- 
tion and states  that  rich countries  are those  that  are patient  (low 
p), create  incentives  to invest  (high  4),  and have  access  to better 
technologies  (high  >). Equation  (17) implicitly  defines  the  steady- 
state  world  growth  rate  and  shows  that  it  is  higher  if countries 
12.  Stability  follows  immediately  since  there  is a single  differential  equation 
describing  the  behavior  of each  country  given  by (13),  and this  differential  equa- 
tion  is  stable  because,  from equation  (14),  a greater  k leads  to a lower  r. 670  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
have  "good"  characteristics,  i.e.,  low values  for p and high  values 
for +  and  ,u. 
International  trade  and specialization  play  an essential  role 
in  shaping  the  world  income  distribution.  To see  this,  use  equa- 
tions  (8), (10),  (11),  and  (12) to write  the  terms  of trade  and the 
rate  of return  to capital  as follows: 
R  gU  /(e -1) 
(18)  terms  of trade  = p = 
(Y)R 
(19)  rate  of return  =  p  Pc  p 
Pi  PC 
These  are the  two key relative  prices  in our economy.  Equa- 
tion  (18) states  that  for a given  measure  of country  technology  pL, 
the  terms  of trade  of the  country  are  decreasing  in  its  relative 
income.  Intuitively,  a  greater  level  of  income  translates  into 
greater  production  for each variety  of intermediates  in which  the 
country  specializes,  and this  greater  supply  reduces  the  relative 
prices  of these  intermediates.  Equation  (19) states  that  for given 
economic  policies  4, the  rate  of return  to capital  is increasing  in 
the  terms  of trade.  This  is  also  intuitive:  a higher  price  for the 
country's  exports  raises  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of 
capital  and hence  the rate of return  to capital.  Equations  (18) and 
(19)  together  explain  why  countries  face  diminishing  returns  to 
capital. 
These  equations  also  illustrate  the  sources  of income  differ- 
ences  across  countries.  To provide  incentives  for  accumulation, 
the  steady-state  rate  of return  to capital  must  equal  the  effective 
rate  of time  preference,  p  +  x8.  Equation  (19)  implies  that  for 
countries  with  greater  patience  and  better  economic  policies, 
lower terms  of trade  are sufficient  to ensure  accumulation  (i.e., to 
ensure  that  the  rate  of return  is equal  to p +  x*).  Equation  (18), 
on  the  other  hand,  translates  lower  terms  of  trade  and  better 
technology  into  a greater  relative  income  level,  YR- So countries 
with  low values  for p and high  values  for 4 and  p will  be richer. 
Equations  (18) and (19) also  give  the  intuition  for the  stabil- 
ity  of the  world  income  distribution.  A  country  with  a  relative 
income level  below its steady-state  value  has terms  of trade above 
its steady  state  (equation  (18)). Terms  of trade  above steady  state 
in turn  translate  into  a rate  of return  to capital  that  exceeds  the 
effective  rate  of  time  preference  (equation  (19)).  This  induces 
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income.  As  this  occurs,  the  terms  of trade  worsen,  the  rate  of 
return  declines,  and  the  rate  of capital  accumulation  converges 
toward  the  world  growth  rate. 
As in most  growth  models,  both the  shape  of the steady-state 
world  income  distribution  and  the  speed  of convergence  toward 
this  steady  state  depend  on the  strength  of diminishing  returns. 
While  in standard  models  diminishing  returns  are postulated  as 
a property  of technology,  in our model  it is derived  from changes 
in relative  prices  resulting  from international  trade  and  special- 
ization.  Naturally,  the  strength  of diminishing  returns  depends 
on the volume  of trade  and the  extent  of specialization.  There are 
stronger  diminishing  returns  when  the  volume  of trade  and  the 
extent  of specialization  are greater  (high  T and low E).  When  T is 
low,  equation  (19) shows  that  the  rate  of return  to capital  is less 
sensitive  to changes  in the  terms  of trade.  In the  limit,  as  T  ->  0, 
we  converge  to  a closed  economy,  the  rate  of return  is  indepen- 
dent  of the  terms  of trade,  and there  are no diminishing  returns. 
In this  case,  as in the  standard  endogenous  growth  models,  very 
small  differences  in  country  characteristics  are  sufficient  to cre- 
ate  arbitrarily  large  differences  in incomes.  Similarly,  when  E is 
high,  equation  (18) shows  that  terms  of trade  are less  sensitive  to 
differences in relative incomes. In the limit as  E  ->  cc, we are back 
to the  endogenous  growth  world. 
III.  EMPIRICAL  IMPLICATIONS  AND  EVIDENCE 
World  income  has  experienced  secular  growth  during  the 
past  200 years.  And over the postwar  era, as suggested  by Figure 
I, most countries  have  grown at similar  rates.  Our model provides 
a unified  framework  for interpreting  these  facts.  Since  there  are 
constant  returns  to  capital  accumulation  from  a global  perspec- 
tive,  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  world  economy  is  endogenous. 
However,  since  there  are diminishing  returns  to capital  accumu- 
lation  at  the  country  level,  the  cross-sectional  behavior  of  the 
world  economy  is  similar  to  that  of  existing  exogenous  growth 
models: cross-country  variation  in economic policies,  savings,  and 
technologies  translate  into  cross-country  variation  in  incomes. 
We  now  discuss  how  our  model  can  be  used  to  interpret  cross- 
country  income  differences  and  patterns  of  conditional  conver- 
gence,  and  provide  some  evidence  of terms-of-trade  effects. 672  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
A.  Quantitative  Implications 
Does  our model  imply  cross-country  income  differences  that 
are  quantitatively  plausible?  To answer  this  question,  first  con- 
sider  the  Solow  [1956] model: countries  save  a fraction  s  of their 
income,  and have  access  to the  Cobb-Douglas  aggregate  produc- 
tion function, y  =  (A  * ext)l  * k,  where A is a country-specific 
efficiency  parameter,  x  is  the  exogenous  rate  of  technological 
progress  common across all countries,  and a is the share  of capital 
in national  product. Since  a  <  1, this  production  function  exhibits 
technological  diminishing  returns.  Define  income  per  effective 
worker  as 9  =  y  e  t*  Then,  steady-state  income is 
(20)  9*  A=*  (-  y  xl 
So countries  that  save  more (high  s)  and are more efficient  (high 
A)  have  higher  per capita  incomes,  although  all  countries  share 
the  same  growth  rate x.  The responsiveness  of income  to savings 
depends  on the  capital  share  ac.  Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil  [19921 
estimated  a version  of equation  (20) and found that  it provides  a 
reasonable  fit to cross-country  differences  in income  for a  2/3. 
Similarly,  Klenow  and  Rodriguez-Clare  [1997]  and  Hall  and 
Jones  [1999]  show  that  given  the  range  of variation  in  capital- 
output  ratios  and  education  across  countries,  the  Solow  model 
accounts  for the observed  differences  in income per capita without 
large  differences  in  the  productivity  term  A  if  a  2/3.  This 
implies  a qualified  success  for the Solow model: given  the share  of 
capital  in  national  product  of  approximately  1/3  as  in  OECD 
economies,  the  framework  accounts  for cross-country  income  dif- 
ferences  only  if  there  are  sizable  differences  in  productivity  or 
efficiency  (the A  term). 
To relate  these  empirical  findings  to our model,  note that  our 
key  equation  (16)  is  in  effect  identical  to (20); in  our model,  the 
savings  rate is s  = PI  * k/y.  So the steady-state  savings  rate is s  = 
x*/(p  +  x*),  and  substituting  this  into  (16),  we  have13 
13.  In  practice,  Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil  [1992]  use  the  investment-to- 
output  ratio i rather  than  the  savings  rate.  Summers  and Heston  [1991] construct 
i  with  a  correction  for differences  in  relative  prices  of investment  goods  across 
countries,  so effectively i = S/Ip.  Using  this definition,  an alternative  way of express- 
ing  the  empirical  predictions  of our model  is YR  =  R * (ilx*)E-.  In  this  case,  the 
efficiency parameter, A, is simply equal to p,, and the equivalent  of a in equation (20) 
is (E -  1)/E. The quantitative  predictions of our model are affected little by this change. THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  673 
s  (E  - W/T 
(E  - 
C  (e1)/T  X} 
Our model therefore implies the same cross-country relationship  as 
the Solow model with two exceptions: (i) the efficiency parameter A 
captures the effects of both the technology term,  p, and the inverse 
of the relative  price of investment  goods, 4; and (ii) the elasticity  of 
relative  income to savings  depends not on the capital share, but on 
the  degree  of specialization,  E,  and the  volume  of trade,  7.  In par- 
ticular, the equivalent  of a  in equation  (20) is (e -  1)/(T +  E  -  1) in 
our model, so the elasticity of output to savings is decoupled from the 
capital share.14 
Does  this  implied  elasticity  of  output  to  savings  generate 
plausible  quantitative  predictions?  Given the  Cobb-Douglas  pref- 
erences,  the  share  of traded  goods,  T, is  the  share  of exports  in 
GDP. Since,  except  for the United  States  and Japan,  this  number 
is  around  30  percent  or  higher  for  rich  economies  (see  World 
Development  Report  [1997]), here we take  it to be  =0.3.  On the 
other  hand,  E  corresponds  to  the  elasticity  of  export  demand. 
Estimates  of this  elasticity  in the literature  are for specific indus- 
tries,  and  vary  between  2 and  10,  although  there  are  also  esti- 
mates  outside  this  range (see, for example,  Feenstra  [1994] or Lai 
and  Trefler  [1999]).  For our purposes,  we  need  the  elasticity  for 
the  whole  economy,  not  for  a  specific  industry.  Below  we  use 
cross-country  data  on changes  in  terms  of trade  to  estimate  an 
elasticity  of E  =  2.6. So here we use  this  as our baseline  estimate. 
With  E  =  2.6,  our  model's  predictions  for  cross-country  income 
differences  are  identical  to  those  of the  Solow  model  with  U. = 
0.85.  Therefore,  in  contrast  to  the  simplest  neoclassical  growth 
model  which  yields  a  small  elasticity  of output  to  savings,  our 
model implies  a reasonably  large elasticity,  and in fact, generates 
cross-country  income  differences  even  larger than  those  observed 
in the  data.  If there  were,  in addition,  technological  diminishing 
returns,  as  in  the  Solow  model,  or  technological  catch-up,  as 
emphasized  for example  by Howitt  [20001, the  implied  elasticity 
of output  to savings  would  be lower.  This  suggests  that  perhaps 
terms-of-trade  effects  emphasized  here  and  technological  dimin- 
ishing  returns  or technological  catch-up  are jointly  important  in 
14.  In this  economy  the  capital  share  in national  product is equal  to 1. In the 
next  section,  when  we  introduce  labor,  the  capital  share  will  no longer  be  1, but 
the  elasticity  of output  to savings  will  remain  unchanged. 674  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
determining  the  effect  of differences  in  saving  rates  and  distor- 
tions  on cross-country  income  differences. 
Does  the  model  also  generate  plausible  implications  for 
growth  dynamics?  Barro  [1991]  and  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin 
[1995] represent  country-level  growth  dynamics  by regressions  of 
the  form, 
(21)  gt=-  I34nyt-,  +ZtO  +ut, 
where gt is the annual growth rate of income of the country between 
some dates t -  1 and t, and Zt is a set of covariates  that  determine 
steady-state  income.  The  parameter  B =  -dgtId  ln Yt-i  is  inter- 
preted as the speed of (conditional) convergence toward steady state. 
These regressions  typically estimate  a value of 13  0.02 correspond- 
ing to a rate of conditional convergence of about 2 percent a year. In 
our model, the growth rate of output can be expressed  as15 
E -1  [(R  -TI/(E-1)  + x1 
(22)  g--  X +  e  (p + x*)  (  y  EI 
When  a county  is at its  steady  state  value,  i.e., YR  =  Y R, it grows 
at the rate (x +  (E  -  1) *  x*)/E,  which is a weighted average of the 
steady-state  world growth rate, x8,  and the current  world growth 
rate,  x.  When  the  world  is  also  in  steady  state,  i.e.,  x  =  x8,  the 
country  grows  at  the  world  growth  rate,  x*.  If YR  is  below  its 
steady-state  value,  it grows at a rate that  depends  on the distance 
away  from this  steady  state,  the  elasticity  of export  demand,  E, 
the  share  of traded  goods,  , and the  rate  of time  preference,  p. 
The implied speed of convergence is therefore 1 =  -dgld  ln y = 
T .  (p  +  X8)  .  (yRIy*)-TI(E-')IE.  As in the Solow-Ramsey  model, the 
speed  of convergence  is  not  constant;  countries  away  from their 
steady  states  grow faster.  Near the steady  state, YR  Y% we have 
that  13= T  (p +  x*)/E.  The baseline  values  of parameters  suggested 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin  [1995] imply that the term in parenthe- 
ses is about 0.1.16  With these  values,  the Solow model with a capital 
15.  To obtain  this  equation,  we use  the  trade  balance  condition  (12) and the 
budget  constraint  (2) to get  an expression  for y  in terms  of world income,  Y, and 
the  capital  stock  of  the  country,  k:  y  =  (,U  -  Y)l/E  *  k(E.71)/E. We  first  time- 
differentiate  this  equation,  next  substitute  from  (13)  for klk  and  (12)  for  r  to 
obtain  an  expression  for y/y,  and  then  substitute  for  the  steady-state  relative 
income  level,  yR,  from (16). 
16.  The standard  formula  includes  the  rate  of population  growth,  n,  and the 
rate  of depreciation  of capital,  8, which  we have  set to zero to simplify  notation.  It 
is easy  to check  that  if we  allow  for positive  population  growth  and depreciation, 
the  speed  of  convergence  would  be  f  =  X  - (p  +  n  +  8  +  x*)/e.  Barro  and 
Sala-i-Martin  suggest  a parameterization  with  an annual  discount  factor of about THE  WORLD INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  675 
share of one-third predicts convergence at approximately 6.6 percent 
a year, considerably faster than the actual speed of convergence.  In 
contrast, with an elasticity of export demand of E =  2.6 and the share 
of exports  in GDP of T  =0.3,  our model implies  that  f-  0.011- 
convergence  at  approximately  1.1 percent  a year,  which  is  slower 
than observed in the data. The predicted speed of convergence would 
be higher again with additional technological diminishing  returns or 
technological  catch-up. 
B.  Empirical  Evidence  on Terms-of-Trade  Effects 
At the  center  of our approach  is the  notion  that  as a country 
accumulates  more capital,  its  terms  of trade  deteriorate.  Is there 
any evidence  supporting  this  notion? A natural  place to start  is to 
look  at  the  correlation  between  growth  and  changes  in  terms  of 
trade.  Consider  equation  (12) which  links  the  terms  of trade  of a 
country  to its  relative  income.  Taking  logs  and time  differences, 
we  obtain 
(23)  Mt=  (gt  -  Xt)I(E-  1)  +  A ln lt, 
where  uTr  is  defined  as  the  rate  of change  in  the  terms  of trade 
between  date t and some prior date t -  1, gt is the rate  of growth 
of the  country's  income,  xt is the  rate  of growth  of world income, 
and A ln  pt is the  change  in technology.  More generally,  this  last 
term  stands  for all changes  that  affect income  and terms  of trade 
positively,  including  changes  in technology  and the world's tastes 
toward  the  country's  products. 
In theory,  we can estimate  an equation  of the form (23) using 
cross-country  data.  Unfortunately,  in  practice,  we  do  not  have 
direct measures  of the technology  term,  A ln  tt,  so the only option 
is to estimate  (23) without  this term,  or with  some proxies.  Figure 
II plots  changes  in terms  of trade between  1965 and 1985 against 
the  growth  rate  of income  during  the  same  period  for the  entire 
set of countries  we have  data on terms  of trade, and separately  for 
non-OPEC  countries.17  It  shows  that  there  is  no  relationship 
between  growth  and changes  in terms  of trade. 
0.99  (i.e.,  p =  0.02),  a  depreciation  rate  of 5 percent,  a world  growth  rate  of 2 
percent,  and a population  growth  rate  of 1 percent  per annum.  This  implies  that 
p +  n  +  8  +  x-  0. 1. 
17.  The  terms-of-trade  data  are  from  Barro  and  Lee  [1993],  in  turn  con- 
structed  from the World Bank  and United  Nations  sources.  Barro and Lee report 
five-year  averages  of  the  changes  in  the  prices  of  exports  minus  the  prices  of 
imports.  The change  in terms  of trade  1965-1985  is the geometric  average  of these 
changes  between  1965  and  1985. 676  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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Does this imply that there  are no terms-of-trade  effects  in the 
data?  Not  necessarily.  Since  changes  in technology,  as  captured 
by  the  A ln  pt  term,  are  directly  correlated  with  changes  in 
income,  estimates  from  an  equation  of  the  form  (23)  and  the 
relationship  shown  in  Figure  II will  be biased.  This  is  the  stan- 
dard  identification  problem,  and  to  make  progress,  we  need  to 
isolate  changes  in  growth  rates  that  are  plausibly  orthogonal 
to  the  omitted  technology  term  A ln  .t  A  plausible  source  of 
variation  would  come  from  countries  growing  at  different  rates 
because  they  have  started  in different  positions  relative  to their 
steady-state  income  level  and  are therefore  accumulating  at dif- 
ferent  rates  to approach  their  steady  state. 
How can we isolate  changes  in income  due to accumulation? 
Here  we  make  a  preliminary  attempt  by  using  a  convergence 
equation  like  (21). Recall  that  these  equations  relate  cross-coun- 
try  differences  in  growth  rates  to two  sets  of factors:  (i) a set  of 
covariates,  Zt, which  determine  the relative  steady-state  position 
of the  country;  and (ii) the  initial  level  of income,  which  captures 
how  far  the  country  is  from  its  relative  steady-state  position. 
Accordingly,  differences  in growth  due to the second  set of factors 
approximate  changes  in income  due to accumulation,  and give us 
an opportunity  to investigate  whether  faster  accumulation  leads 
to worse  terms  of trade. 
The  estimating  equation  is 
(24)  7rt =  8  gt + Z'  + Vt 
where,  as before, 'at is the rate of change  in terms  of trade,  and gt 
is  the  growth  rate  of output.  We  will  estimate  (24)  using  Two- 
Stage  Least  Squares  (2SLS),  instrumenting  gt  using  equation 
(21).  The  vector  Zt  includes  potential  determinants  of  steady- 
state  income,  in particular,  human  capital  and institutions  vari- 
ables.  The coefficient  of interest  is  8, which,  in our theory,  corre- 
sponds to  -  1/(E  -  1) as in (23). The excluded instrument in our 
2SLS estimation  is the initial  level  of income,  ln Yt- 1. Intuitively, 
conditional  on  income  growth  and  other  covariates,  the  initial 
level  of income  should  not  affect  the  terms  of trade.18 
18.  In the presence  of technological  convergence,  countries  below their  steady 
state  may also be improving  their technologies,  and lnyt-1  may be correlated  with 
A ln  Ft.  In this  case,  our estimate  of 8 would be biased  upwards,  stacking  the cards 
against  finding  a negative  6. More generally,  this  consideration  suggests  that  we 
may want  to interpret  our estimate  of the  strength  of the terms-of-trade  effects  as 
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Table  I  reports  cross-sectional  regressions  of  the  rate  of 
change  of terms  of trade  between  1965  and  1985  on the  growth 
rate of income  over the same  period and various  sets  of covariates 
as in equation  (24) (all data  are from Barro and Lee  [1993]).  The 
top panel  reports  the 2SLS  estimate  of 8, the coefficient  on output 
growth  in  equation  (24).  The  middle  panel  gives  the  first-stage 
coefficient  on  ln Yt- 1,  .  Finally,  the  bottom  panel  reports  the 
OLS estimate  of 8. Naturally,  in the  first  stage  and the  OLS the 
same  covariates  as the 2SLS  are included,  but the coefficients  are 
not reported  to  save  space.  Different  columns  correspond  to dif- 
ferent  sets  of covariates.  In the  first-stage  relationship,  the  coef- 
ficients  are very  similar  to the  convergence  equations  estimated 
by  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  [1995],  and  we  do not  report  them 
here. 
In column  (1) we  start  with  a minimal  set  of covariates  that 
control for human  capital  differences.  These  are average  years  of 
schooling  in the population  over age 25 in 1965  and the log of life 
expectancy  at birth  in  1965.  Both  of these  variables  are typically 
found  to be  important  determinants  of steady-state  relative  in- 
come  levels  (or country  growth  rates),  so they  are  natural  vari- 
ables  to  include  in  our Zt vector.  We  also  include  a dummy  for 
OPEC  countries  (in  our  sample,  these  are  Algeria,  Indonesia, 
Iran,  Iraq,  and  Venezuela).  The  coefficient  on log  GDP  in  1965, 
reported  in  Panel  B,  shows  the  standard  result  of  conditional 
convergence  at the  speed  of approximately  2 percent  a year.  The 
estimate  of the coefficient  of interest,  8, in column  (1) is  -0.6  with 
a  standard  error  of  0.27.  This  estimate  implies  that  a  country 
growing  1 percentage  point  faster  due  to  accumulation  experi- 
ences  a  0.6  percentage  point  decline  in  its  terms  of trade.  This 
estimate  is  statistically  significant  at  the  5  percent  level.  The 
coefficient  on years  of schooling  is  insignificant,  while  the  coeffi- 
cients  on life  expectancy  and the  OPEC dummy  are positive  and 
statistically  significant.  The coefficient  on the  OPEC dummy  im- 
plies that,  all else  equal,  the terms  of trade of the OPEC countries 
improved at approximately  0.091  percentage  points  a year during 
this  period.  We return  to the  interpretation  of the  other  covari- 
ates  later.  Notice  also  that,  as  suggested  by Figure  II, the  OLS 
coefficient  reported  in  Panel  C  is  insignificant  and  practically 
equal to 0. The contrast  between  the OLS and the 2SLS estimates 
likely  reflects  the  fact  that  the  2SLS  procedure  is  isolating 
changes  in  income  that  are  due  to  accumulation  and  hence  or- 
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TABLE I 
IV REGRESSIONS  OF  GROWTH  RATE  OF  TERMS  OF  TRADE 
Adding  Adding  Adding 
Main  Detailing  political  change  change  Nonoil 
regression  schooling  indicat  in  Sch  in  Sch  sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel  A: Two-stage  least  squares 
GDP Growth  -0.595  -0.578  -0.458  -0.561  -0.455  -0.620 
1965-1985  (0.265)  (0.261)  (0.221)  (0.248)  (0.187)  (0.354) 
Years  of  -0.001  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001 
schooling  1965  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Years  of  -0.002 
primary  (0.003) 
schooling  1965 
Years  of  -0.002 
secondary  (0.006) 
schooling  1965 
Years  of higher  0.019 
schooling  1965  (0.034) 
Log of life  0.043  0.045  0.034  0.020  0.046 
expectancy  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
1965 
OPEC  dummy  0.091  0.090  0.092  0.086  0.087 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
War dummy  -0.013 
(0.005) 
Political  0.007 
instability  (0.023) 
Log black  -0.005 
market  (0.012) 
premium 
Change  in years  0.008  0.009 
of schooling  (0.004)  (0.003) 
1965-1985 
Change  in log of  -0.000  -0.042 
life  expectancy  (0.078)  (0.045) 
1965-1985 
Panel  B: First-stage  for GDP growth 
Log of GDP  1965  -0.019  -0.020  -0.024  -0.020  -0.020  -0.016 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
R2  0.35  0.36  0.54  0.47  0.47  0.34 
Panel  C: Ordinary  least  squares 
GDP Growth  0.037  0.037  0.038  0.041  -0.005  0.116 
1965-1985  (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.112)  (0.103)  (0.114) 
N. of obs  79  79  70  79  79  74 
"Growth Rate of Terms of Trade" is measured  as the  annual  growth rate of export prices minus  the growth 
rate of import prices. The OPEC dummy takes value  1 for five countries in our sample  (Algeria, Indonesia,  Iran, 
Iraq, and Venezuela).  The political instability  variable is the average of the number of assassinations  per million 
inhabitants  per year  and the  number  of revolutions  per year,  the  war variable  is  a dummy  for countries  that 
fought  at least  one war  over the  period  1965-1985,  and the  log black  market  premium  is  the  average  of the 
logarithm of the black market premium over the period 1965-1985.  All the data are from the Barro-Lee data set. 
Excluded  instrument  is  log of output  in  1965 in  columns  (1), (2), (3), and (4) and (6), while  in  column  (5) 
excluded instruments  are log of output in 1965, years of schooling in 1965, and the log of life expectancy in 1965. 680  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
In  column  (2)  we  enter  years  of  primary,  secondary,  and 
tertiary  schooling  separately,  and  this  has  little  effect  on  the 
estimate  of 8  Column (3) adds a number  of common controls  used 
by  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  [1995]  to  control  for  differences  in 
institutions  and property rights,  which  are likely  to be first-order 
determinants  of  productivity  and  technology  and,  hence,  of 
steady-state  income.  These  institutional  variables  are an index  of 
political  instability,  a dummy  for experiencing  a war  during  this 
period, and the log of the black market  premium.  The estimate  is 
now  -0.46  (standard  error  =  0.21).19 
The  coefficients  on the  covariates  in columns  (1)-(4)  are dif- 
ficult to interpret  because  they  refer to values  at the beginning  of 
the  sample.  For example,  a  10 percent  higher  life  expectancy  in 
1965  is  associated  with  0.5  percentage  point  improvement  in 
terms  of trade.  This  may  capture  the  fact  that  initial  level  of 
life  expectancy  is  correlated  with  subsequent  changes  in these 
human  capital  variables  and therefore  possibly  correlated  with 
A ln  pLt  as  well.  In  columns  (5)  and  (6) we  add  the  changes  in 
years  of schooling  and  life  expectancy  between  1965  and  1985 
to  the  basic  regression  of  column  (1).  In  column  (5)  these 
changes  are  entered  as  additional  covariates.  In column  (6) we 
instead  use  the  initial  levels  of  years  of  schooling  and  life 
expectancy  as  excluded  instruments  in  addition  to  the  initial 
level  of income.  In both  columns  the  estimate  of 8 is  similar  to 
our  baseline  estimate,  and  statistically  significant  at  the  5 
percent  level.  We find that  changes  in the  years  of schooling  are 
positive  and  significant  in  the  second  stage,  indicating  that 
countries  that  increased  their  human  capital  over  this  period 
experienced  improvements  in  their  terms  of  trade.  This  is 
reasonable  since  improvements  in  human  capital  are  likely  to 
be  correlated  with  A-ln  ft.20 
Finally,  in  column  (7) we  repeat  the  basic  regression  of col- 
19.  As  in  typical  cross-country  growth  regression  analyses,  these  institu- 
tional  variables  are treated  as  exogenous.  We  also  experimented  with  a specifi- 
cation  instrumenting  for  a  measure  of institutions  among  the  former  colonies 
using  the  mortality  rates  of European  colonizers  following  Acemoglu,  Johnson, 
and  Robinson  [2001a].  Unfortunately,  the  restriction  to  former  colonies  left  us 
with  too small  a sample,  and the  results  were  insignificant. 
20.  We  experimented  with  different  specifications  and  various  subsets  of 
covariates,  with  similar  results.  We also  estimated  8 using  decadal  changes,  and 
a random-effect  model  as  in  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  [1995]  and  Barro  [1997]'s 
favorite  specification.  In  this  case,  the  results  are  similar  to  those  reported  in 
Table I. For example,  the equivalent  of column  (1) yields  an estimate  of 8 of -0.88 
with  a standard  error of 0.42,  while  the  equivalent  of column  (6) which  excludes 
oil producers  yields  an estimate  of -0.85  with  a standard  error of 0.51. THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  681 
umn  (1) excluding  the  five OPEC countries  from the  sample.  The 
estimate  of 8 is  -0.62  (standard  error =  0.35),  which  is no longer 
significant  at the 5 percent  level,  but significant  at the  10 percent 
level. 
Figure  III gives  a visual  representation  of the  2SLS  estimate 
reported  in columns  (3) and (6) of Table I. On the vertical  axis we 
have  the  component  of the  changes  in the  terms  of trade  that  is 
orthogonal  to  the  covariates  included  in  the  regression,  and  on 
the  horizontal  axis,  the  projection  of GDP growth  on our instru- 
ment,  initial  income,  again  orthogonalized  with  respect  to the  set 
of  covariates.  The  OLS  regression  of  the  first  variable  on  the 
second  will  give  precisely  the  corresponding  2SLS  estimate.  The 
figure  shows  that  countries  predicted  to  grow  faster  because  of 
relatively  low  initial  income  (relative  to  their  human  capital 
indicators),  such  as the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Taiwan,  or Korea, 
typically  experienced  a worsening  in  their  terms  of trade  com- 
pared  with  countries  with  relatively  high  initial  income,  such  as 
Mexico,  Switzerland,  or France. 
Overall,  the  results  in  Table  I  provide  some  preliminary 
evidence  that  higher  output  growth  due to accumulation  is asso- 
ciated  with  a worsening  in the  terms  of trade,  as implied  by our 
mechanism.  Nevertheless,  given  the  relatively  low  number  of 
observations  and the usual  difficulties  in interpreting  cross-coun- 
try regressions,  this  result  has  to be interpreted  with  caution. 
We can also use the magnitudes  of the coefficient  estimates  to 
compute  implied  values  for the  export  demand  elasticity  E.  For 
example,  the  estimate  in column  (1),  -0.6,  implies  that  E  2.6. 
This  is  a reasonable  elasticity  estimate,  within  the  range  of the 
industry  estimates.  Returning  to the  discussion  in  the  previous 
subsection,  recall  that  with  a value  of  E  around  2.6,  our  model 
accounts  for much  of the variability  in income  levels  across  coun- 
tries  (in  fact,  as  noted  above,  it  somewhat  "overexplains"  the 
observed  differences).  Therefore,  this  evidence  suggests  that 
terms-of-trade  effects  may  be quantitatively  important  in under- 
standing  the  observed  patterns  of  cross-country  income  differ- 
ences  and growth. 
IV.  LABOR, WAGES,  AND PRODUCT PRICES 
Capital  is the only factor of production  in the model of Section 
II.  This  limits  the  potential  applications  of  the  model.  It  also 
makes  our approach  silent  on two important  features  of the  data: 682  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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(1) that  wages  for comparable  workers  are higher  in richer  coun- 
tries;  and (2) that  costs  of living  are higher  in rich countries  (see 
Summers  and  Heston  [1991]).  Fortunately,  it is  straightforward 
to generalize  our baseline  model  of Section  II by adding  labor as 
another  factor  of  production:  all  of  the  implications  we  have 
emphasized  so far remain  unchanged,  and in addition,  the model 
generates  higher  wages  and  higher  costs  of  living  in  richer 
countries. 
A.  The Model  with  Labor 
Let  us  add  two  assumptions  to  our  basic  model.  First,  the 
production  of the  consumption  good now  requires  labor.  In par- 
ticular,  we  adopt the  following  unit  cost function: 
(25)  Bc(w,rp(z))  =  w(l  Y)(T)  .r'y(l  T)  [  p(Z)l-E  *dz 
which  is  identical  to  equation  (10),  except  for  the  presence  of 
domestic  labor services  in production,  implying  that  the consump- 
tion  goods  sector  uses  labor  in  addition  to  capital  and  traded 
intermediates. 
Second,  each  consumer  supplies  one  unit  of labor  inelasti- 
cally.  The budget  constraint  of the  representative  consumer  then 
becomes 
(26)  p1k?  +?pcC  =y  r  k  + w, 
where  w is the wage  rate.  The rest  of the  assumptions  in subsec- 
tion A remain  the same.  The model in this  section  is therefore  the 
limiting  case  in  which  y ->  1. In this  limit,  labor  is  not  used  in 
production,  and the  wage  is  zero. 
Consumers  now  maximize  the  utility  function  (1) subject  to 
the  new budget  constraint  (26). The solution  to this  problem  still 
involves  the  Euler  equation  (5) and  the  transversality  condition 
(6). Once  again  integrating  the  budget  constraint  and  using  the 
Euler  and  transversality  conditions,  we  obtain  the  consumption 
rule  as 
(27)  PcC c  p,  (p  P*k  +  w*  e  o(r?PI)/pIdv.  dt) 684  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
The  optimal  rule  is  still  to  consume  a  fixed  fraction  of wealth, 
which  now  also  includes  the  net  present  value  of wages. 
The  existence  of labor  income  has  no  effect  on firms  in  the 
intermediate  and investment  goods  sectors.  So equations  (8) and 
(11) still  apply.  But the  condition  that  price equals  marginal  cost 
for the  firms  in the  consumption  good sector  is now  given  by 
(28)  p _-C W  )  (1  -)  *lry(-T) 
so prices  of consumption  goods  depend  on the  wage  rate. 
Since  we  now  have  two  factor  markets,  the  trade  balance 
condition,  (12), is not sufficient  to ensure  market  clearing,  and we 
need  to  add  a  labor  market  clearing  condition  to  complete  the 
model.  Labor  demand  comes  only  from  the  consumption  goods 
sector,  and  given  the  Cobb-Douglas  assumption,  this  demand  is 
(1  -  'y) *  (1  -  T) times consumption expenditure, pc  *  c, divided by 
the  wage  rate,  w.  So the  market  clearing  condition  for labor is 
(29)  1  =  (1  -  y)  .  (1  -  )*((Pc  c)Iw). 
It  is  useful  to  note  that  (29)  implies  labor  income,  w,  is 
always  proportional  to consumption  expenditure.  Using  this  fact, 
we  can  simplify  the  optimal  consumption  rule,  (27),  to obtain 
(30)  PC*  c=1  (1  -  )  (1)  k. 
The law of motion of the world economy  is again  described  by 
a distribution  of capital  stocks,  but now this  distribution  is given 
by a triplet  of equations  for each  country:21 
(31)  klk  =  ?, - rT  _  p. 
(32)  rk  +w  =  [  rl-E.{  (rk  + w)  dG. 
w  (1  -  -Y)  * (I  -  T)  *p 
(33)  k  k+  ww  =  +  T]  T+(l-)(I  (l-)  p 
Equation  (31) is the law of motion for capital.  It is identical  to 
(13) and gives the evolution  of the distribution  of capital  stocks for 
21.  To obtain  (31), we start  with  (26), and substitute  for w using  (29), forpc C 
c  using  (30),  and  for PI  using  (11).  Equation  (32)  is  simply  the  trade  balance 
condition,  (12), rearranged  withy  =  r *  k +  w.  Finally,  we use  (11), (29),  and (30) 
to express  w  as  a function  of k and r,  and then  rearrange  to obtain  (33). THE  WORLD INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  685 
a  given  distribution  of  rental  rates.  Equation  (32)  determines 
the  cross  section  of  rental  rates  for  a  given  distribution  of 
capital  stocks  and  wage  rates.  The  third  equation,  (33),  de- 
fines  the labor share-wage  income  divided  by total  income.  This 
equation  also  shows  that  the  behavior  of the  labor  share  simply 
depends  on the rental  rate: as the rental  rate increases,  the labor 
share  falls. 
The  steady-state  world  distribution  of income  follows  from 
equations  (31) and  (32).  In steady  state,  k/k  =  x*;  i.e.,  all  coun- 
tries  will  grow  at  the  same  rate.  This  immediately  gives  the 
steady-state  rental  rate  as  in  equation  (15)  from  the  previous 
section.  More important  for our purposes,  the  steady-state  distri- 
bution  of  income  and  the  world  growth  rate  are  still  given  by 
equations  (16)  and  (17).  Therefore,  the  intuition  regarding  the 
determinants  of the  cross-sectional  distribution  of income  from 
subsection  C  applies  exactly.  Moreover,  the  empirical  implica- 
tions,  and  the  fit  of the  model  to existing  evidence,  discussed  in 
Section  III, are also  valid.22 But  there  are now new  implications 
for the  cross  section  of wages  and  some  key  relative  prices. 
B.  Factor  and  Product  Prices 
Equations  (31),  (32),  and  (33)  give  the  steady-state  factor 
prices.  The steady-state  rental  rate  of capital  is still  given  by (14) 
from Section  II. In addition,  the  steady-state  wage  rate  is 
(34)  w  Y 
[Y +  (1-  Y) - T  )  -  ?  p  .  y. 
In the  cross  section  the  rental  rate  of capital  continues  to be 
lower in richer countries,  i.e.,  countries  with  low p and high 4).  In 
contrast,  wages  tend  to  be higher  in  richer  countries:  countries 
with  better  technology  (high  >) and with  better  economic  policies 
(high  4)) will  have  higher  wages.  Both  of  these  follow  because 
richer  countries  generate  a  greater  demand  for  consumption, 
increasing  the  demand  for labor and wages.23 
22.  The  equation  describing  convergence  to  steady  state  is  also  similar.  In 
particular,  equation  (22) from the previous  section  still  gives  the rate  of growth  of 
capital  income  (relative  to average  capital  income),  say yk,  but now total  income 
also includes  labor income.  We can write  relative  income  as YR  3YQR  kwhere  R 
is  the  share  of capital  income  relative  to the  average  value  of this  share  in  the 
world. So long as factor shares  do not change  much near the steady  state,  equation 
(22) still  describes  the  convergence  properties  of this  more  general  model. 
23.  Interestingly,  the effect  of p on wages  is ambiguous.  Countries  with  low p 
will  accumulate  more  and  tend  to be richer,  and  through  the  same  mechanism, 686  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
The contrast  between  the behavior  of the  rental  rate  and the 
wage  rate  in the  time  series  is also  interesting.  While  the  rental 
rate  of capital  remains  constant,  equation  (34) shows  that  wages 
in  all  countries  grow  at  the  rate  of world  income  growth.  This 
prediction  is  consistent  with  the  stylized  facts  on  the  long-run 
behavior  of factor prices. 
Finally,  recall  that  equation  (33) gives  the  share  of labor  in 
national  product,  so  the  capital  share  in  national  product  is  no 
longer equal to 1, while  relative  income differences  are exactly  the 
same  as in the  model  of Sections  II and IV. This  highlights  that, 
as  claimed  before,  the  result  that  the  responsiveness  of relative 
income  to savings  and economic  policies  depends  on the  share  of 
exports  in GDP and export  demand  elasticity  was  not predicated 
on a capital  share  of 1.24 
What  about  product  prices? While  in the  model  of Section  II 
both  consumption  and  investment  goods  were  cheaper  in  rich 
countries,  now equation  (28) implies  that  consumption  goods tend 
to be more  expensive  in richer  countries.  This  is  because  wages 
are  higher  in  rich  countries.  As  a result,  the  cost  of living  (the 
geometric  average  of consumption  and  investment  goods  prices) 
could be higher  in rich countries.  In fact, since the share  of income 
spent  on investment  goods  is  small,  differences  in  consumption 
good  prices  are  likely  to  dominate,  making  the  costs  of  living 
higher  in richer  countries. 
Next,  note  that  the  relative  price of investment  goods is now 
PI/Pc  =  +-'(wlr)-(Y->)  (l-T).  This is different  from the relative 
price  expression  in  the  previous  model  because  of  the  second 
term,  which  incorporates  the  fact  that  consumption  goods  are 
more  labor-intensive  than  investment  goods.  Our model  in  Sec- 
tion II generated  lower relative  prices  of investment  goods in rich 
countries  only because  of differences  in policies,  4. Now  we have 
they  will  have  a greater  demand  for consumption  and higher  wages.  However,  as 
equation  (30) shows,  everything  else  equal,  a country with  low p will consume  less, 
which  tends  to  reduce  the  demand  for consumption  and  wages.  Differentiation 
gives  that 
aw*  ['y ?+(I  -  y) .T]1x*  -T-(p  + x*) 
< 0  E  e>  1?+ 
p2  +  [y  +  (1-Y)  *  ]  p  x 
In  other  words,  as  long  as  the  elasticity  of  foreign  demand  is  large  enough, 
countries  with  low  p will  have  higher  wages. 
24.  More  generally,  although  the  responsiveness  of output  to  saving  rates 
and policies  does  not  depend  on the  capital  share  in  national  product,  it  can be 
shown  that  it  does  depend  on the  capital  share  in the  investment  goods  sector. THE WORLD  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  687 
an additional  effect reinforcing  this:  richer countries  have  higher 
wages,  reducing  the  relative  prices  of investment  goods. 
V.  SPECIALIZATION  AND TECHNOLOGY  DIFFERENCES 
The previous  sections  have  shown  how trade  and specializa- 
tion  shape  the  process  of world growth  and cross-country  income 
differences.  At the center  stage  of our framework  are diminishing 
returns  due  to  terms-of-trade  effects:  as  countries  accumulate 
more capital,  they  increase  the  production  of the  commodities  in 
which  they  specialize,  and their  terms  of trade worsen.  There  are 
two  assumptions  underlying  this  mechanism: 
1.  Each  country  specializes  in  a different  set  of products. 
2.  The set of products  a country produces is fixed (or, at least, 
it does  not grow proportionally  with  its  income). 
The  importance  of these  two  assumptions  is  highlighted  in 
equation  (18). If countries  were not specialized,  or if e --  cc so that 
different  goods  were  perfect  substitutes,  they  would  face  flat 
export  demands.  In this  case,  capital  accumulation  and  greater 
production  of intermediates  would not worsen  the terms  of trade. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  set  of  products  in  which  a  country 
specializes  were proportional  to its income,  the production  of each 
variety  would  not  change  with  income.  In  this  case,  even  with 
downward-sloping  export  demands,  capital  accumulation  would 
not worsen  the  terms  of trade. 
In this  section  we  show  that  these  assumptions  can be justi- 
fied as the  equilibrium  of a model  in which  countries  choose  the 
set of goods they  produce. We use  a model of specialization  due to 
increasing  returns  as  in  Helpman  and  Krugman  [19851 to illus- 
trate  our main  point.  The working  paper  version  [Acemoglu  and 
Ventura  2001]  shows  that  our  results  also  apply  if  specializa- 
tion  is  driven  by costly  product  development,  for example,  as  in 
Grossman  and Helpman  [1991]. 
We  introduce  two  modifications  to  the  model  of Section  IV. 
First,  we  assume  that  there  is an infinite  mass  of intermediates, 
and all firms  in  all countries  know  how to produce  them.  Hence, 
all  countries  have  access  to  the  same  technology  frontier.  The 
total  number  of goods  produced,  M,  as  well  as  its  distribution 
among  countries,  p, is determined  as part  of the  equilibrium. 
Second,  we  assume  that  one  worker  is  needed  to  run  the 
production  process  for each  intermediate.  So there  is a fixed  cost 
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is required  to produce  one unit  of each  intermediate,  so there  is 
also  a variable  cost  in  terms  of the  rental  rate  of capital,  r.  The 
rest  of the  assumptions  from Section  IV still  apply. 
The  consumer  problem  is  still  to maximize  (1) subject  to the 
budget  constraint,  (26). The solution  continues  to be given  by the 
Euler  equation  (5) and  the  transversality  condition  (6),  and  the 
consumption  rule  is  still  represented  by  (27)  from  the  previous 
section. 
Firms  in the  consumption  and investment  goods sectors  face 
the  same  problem  as  before,  and  equations  (11)  and  (25)  still 
determine  their prices. But firms in the intermediate  goods sector 
are now subject to economies  of scale.  Since  an infinite  number  of 
varieties  are available  at no cost, no two firms will  ever choose to 
produce  the  same  good.  So each  producer  is  a monopolist.  With 
isoelastic  demands,  all intermediate  good monopolists  in a coun- 
try  will  set  the  same  price,  equal  to  a  constant  markup  over 
marginal  cost  (which  is equal  to the  rental  rate,  r): 
(35)  p  -  (E/(E  -  1)) *  r. 
Hence,  the  terms  of trade  are no longer  equal,  but simply  propor- 
tional,  to the  rental  rate  of capital.  Because  of the  markup  over 
marginal  cost,  each producer  makes  variable  profits  equal  to E-1 
times  its  revenue,  T  p 1E  * Y. As long  as  these  variable  profits 
exceed  the  cost  of entry,  there  will  be entry.  So we  have  a free- 
entry  equation  equating  variable  profits  to fixed  costs: 
(36)  w -  (T/E)  -  y 
where  w,  the  wage  rate,  is  the  fixed  cost  of producing  an  inter- 
mediate,  since  one  worker  is  required  to  run  the  production 
process. 
The  trade  balance  equation,  (12),  still  applies.  The  market 
clearing  condition  for labor needs  to be modified  because  now  pL 
workers  are employed  in the  intermediate  sector: 
(37)  1 -  ffi  =  (I  -  ')"  (1  -  T)  *(Pc  c)/w. 
Notice  that  the consumption-to-capital  ratio is no longer  con- 
stant,  so  we  need  to  add  this  ratio,  z  (Pc  * c)I(p,  - k),  as  a 
costate  variable,  and  include  the  transversality  condition  to  de- 
termine  the  trajectory  of the  system.  In addition,  the  number  of 
varieties  is  now  endogenous  and  will  be  determined  from  the 
free-entry  condition,  equation  (36). THE  WORLD INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  689 
The laws  of motion  of the key variables  is given  by two blocks 
of equations  for each  country: 
1. Dynamics.  For a given  distribution  of factor  prices,  r and 
w,  and  varieties,  [L, this  block  determines  the  evolution  of the 
distribution  of capital  stocks:25 
k  [  _  (l-~~~y)*(lT)l 
(38)  r  1  z. 
Z  [1-  I_  ]*  -  p 
(40)  lim  z  e-Pt  =  0. 
t-*co 
Equation  (38) gives  the evolution  of the capital  stock as a function 
of the rental  rate r, the number  of varieties,  [L,  and the  consump- 
tion-to-capital  ratio,  z.  It differs  from (31)  only  because  the  con- 
sumption-to-capital  ratio  now  varies  over  time.  Equation  (39) 
gives  the  evolution  of the  consumption-to-capital  ratio  as a func- 
tion  of the  number  of varieties,  [L.  Finally,  equation  (40)  is  the 
transversality  condition. 
2. Factor prices  and  varieties.  Three  equations  give the  cross 
section  of factor prices  and the  number  of varieties  of intermedi- 
ates  as  functions  of the  distribution  of  capital  stocks  and  con- 
sumption  to capital  ratios:26 
(41)  r-k+w=  (  1  4r-E  (rrk1+rw)k+dG. 
(42) 
' 
T)w  (l-y)*(l-v)*z  rk  +  w  (1-  pi)  rT+  (1-  y)  (1-T)  z 
T  tE  \l-Er  (43)  w =  r  k  (r  k + w) *dG. 
E  \El-I 
Equation  (43) is the  trade  balance  equation  and differs  from (32) 
25.  To obtain  (38), we start  with  (26), and substitute  for w using  (37), forpc  C 
c using  the  definition  z  (pc  * c)I(pI  * k),  and  for PI  using  (11).  Equation  (39) 
follows  from substituting  for w from the  market  clearing  equation  (37) into  (26) 
and  using  the  definition  z  (Pc  c)I(p,  * k). 
26.  Equation  (41) follows  from (12)  combined  with  (35).  The wage  equation, 
(42), follows  from the  market  clearing  condition  for labor, (37),  and the  definition 
of z in a manner  analogous  to the derivation  of equation  (33) in footnote 21. Finally 
the free-entry  equation,  (43), is obtained by substituting  for world income, Y. 690  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
because,  due to monopoly  power, the  rental  rate  and the terms  of 
trade  are  not  equal  (see  equation  (35)).  Equation  (42)  gives  the 
labor share.  Finally,  (43) is the  free  entry  condition. 
The  dynamics  of  the  world  economy  are  again  stable  and 
converge  to a unique  steady  state.  This  steady  state  is described 
by two  equations  similar  to (16)  and  (17): 
E  /  \E/  ( 
E  I)  1)/Ir 
(44)  YR =  [  *  .e_1  P  8 
(45)  j  E  .)(')  *dG =  1. 
The  reason  why  (44)  and  (45)  differ  from  (16)  and  (17)  is  the 
presence  of monopoly  markup.  Otherwise,  they  are  identical  to 
(16)  and  (17),  and  imply  the  same  cross-sectional  relationship 
between  economic  policies,  saving  rates,  and technology. 
The  key  modification  is  that  the  number  of varieties  is  now 
endogenous  and given  by27 
(46)  *  -  T -  x  Y)  T)] 
IL  p  [7  +  E*  (1-y)  (1  -  T)]  ?  T -X 
The  only  country-specific  variable  in  this  equation  is  p. So  all 
countries  have  similar  p's,  but  those  with  lower  discount  rates 
(and  hence  higher  saving  rates)  endogenously  specialize  in  the 
production  of more goods-  or loosely  speaking,  they  will  "choose 
better  technologies."  Intuitively,  countries  with  low p accumulate 
more capital  and have  a larger capital  stock relative  to their wage 
rates.  For  a  given  number  of  goods,  they  therefore  face  worse 
terms  of trade.  Consequently,  they  find it profitable  to incur  the 
fixed cost  of production  for more goods. 
Now  that  technology  differences,  v's,  are  endogenous,  there 
are two  determinants  of cross-country  income  differences:  coun- 
tries  with  better  economic  policies  (i.e.,  high  +) will  be richer  for 
the  same  reasons  as before.  Countries  with  lower  discount  rates 
(i.e., high  p) will be richer both because  of the reasons  highlighted 
in Sections  II and IV, and because  they will choose to specialize  in 
the  production  of more intermediates. 
27.  To obtain  this  equation,  we  divide  the  free-entry  condition  (43)  by  the 
trade balance  condition  (41) to get wI(r *  k +  w)  =  /((e * p).  We equate  this  to the 
labor  share  equation,  (42),  and  then  substitute  the  steady-state  value  of z  from 
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Notice  that  technology  differences  in this model simply trans- 
late  into  differences  in  relative  incomes,  not  long-run  growth 
rates.  This  appears  plausible  since  there  is  evidence  pointing  to 
significant  technology  differences  across  countries  (e.g.,  Klenow 
and  Rodriguez-Clare  [1997]  and  Hall  and  Jones  [1999]),  and  as 
noted  in the Introduction,  these  differences  do not seem  to lead to 
permanent  differences  in growth  rates. 
To understand  why  the  steady-state  number  of goods  is  in- 
dependent  of  the  level  of  capital  stock  or income  (cf.  equation 
(46)), denote  the fixed cost of production  by f (in equation  (36), we 
had  f  =  w).  Then  using  (12),  the  free-entry  condition  can  be 
written  as  =  =  (T/E)  - (ylf  ). This equation  states  that  the number 
of  goods  in  which  a  country  specializes  is  proportional  to  its 
income  divided  by the fixed cost of production.  The reason  why  p. 
is  constant  is  that  as  y  increases  f  increases  also.  This  is  a 
consequence  of the assumption  that  fixed costs  are in terms  of the 
scarce  factor.  As  the  country  becomes  richer,  demand  for labor 
increases,  causing  a proportional  increase  in  the  wage  rate.  So, 
ylf  and  p. remain  constant.28 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This  paper  has  presented  a model  of the  world  income  dis- 
tribution  in which  all  countries  share  the  same  long-run  growth 
rate  because  of terms-of-trade  effects.  Countries  that  accumulate 
faster  supply more of the goods that they  specialize  in to the world 
and  experience  worse  terms  of trade.  This  reduces  the  return  to 
further  accumulation  and creates  a demand pull on other nations. 
We view  this  model  as  an  attractive  alternative  to  the  existing 
approaches  where  common long-run  growth rates  result  only if all 
countries  share  the  same  technology. 
Naturally,  a theory  of diminishing  returns  due  to terms-of- 
trade  effects  does not preclude  diminishing  returns  in production 
or cross-country  technological  spillovers.  It is relatively  straight- 
28.  It  is  also  useful  to  contemplate  what  would  happen  if  the  fixed  cost  f 
depended  on the  wage  rate,  but less  than  proportionately,  say f  =  w4.  As long  as 
t >  0,  ,u would  still  increase  with  income,  but  less  than  proportionately.  As  a 
result,  our key  mechanism,  that  an increase  in production  translates  into  worse 
terms  of trade,  would  continue  to hold,  since,  from equation  (18),  terms  of trade 
are proportional  to  ply,  and  are  decreasing  in y.  Nevertheless,  in  this  case,  the 
model would  not be well  behaved  for another  reason:  as  p.  increases  with  income, 
the  world  growth  rate  would  increase  over  time,  eventually  becoming  infinite. 
This  explains  our particular  choice  of f  =  w to preserve  steady  growth. 692  Q UARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
forward-although  cumbersome-to  write  down a model with  all 
of these  factors present  and complementing  each other. The more 
important  question  is their relative  contribution  to explaining  the 
actual  world  income  distribution.  Here,  we  made  a preliminary 
attempt  at  estimating  the  extent  of terms-of-trade  effects.  Our 
results  show  that  a  country  accumulating  faster  than  others 
experiences  a worsening  in its  terms  of trade,  and the  estimated 
strength  of the terms-of-trade  effect suggests  that  our mechanism 
could be important  in understanding  cross-country  differences  in 
income  levels. 
Naturally,  other  factors  could  be  driving  the  negative  rela- 
tionship  between  faster  accumulation  and the  decline  in terms  of 
trade,  so future  empirical  work on this  topic is necessary.  Never- 
theless,  to  our knowledge,  ours  is  the  first  investigation  of why 
faster  accumulation  leads  to a lower value  of marginal  product of 
capital-it  is  typically  assumed  that  this  is  due  to technological 
diminishing  returns,  despite  no direct  evidence  of this  effect.  In 
contrast,  we  showed,  both  theoretically  and  empirically,  that 
faster  accumulation  may lead  to a lower value  of marginal  prod- 
uct of capital  because  of its  effect  on the  terms  of trade. 
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